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 Abstract
Western societies usually cherish rational thought but distrust their 
feelings as sound basis of information. Contrary to this perception 
of feelings as being maladaptive, this contribution argues that 
fl uency experiences generally allow for valid judgments and deci-
sion. For this argument, we focus on the processes underlying the 
use of fl uency in judgment, in particular the two process steps of 
attribution and interpretation. We argue that these two process 
steps operate on swift defaults but are backed-up with sophisti-
cated safety nets. Together, defaults and safety-nets allow for both 
effi cient judgment formation and generally valid judgments. We 
conclude that it is time to have more faith in fl uency as information 
when forming judgments. 
 Western societies cherish rational thought and recommend reaching important 
judgments and decisions via conscious deliberation of content information. 
Reliance on feelings, in contrast, is often considered erroneous and fallible (e.g., 
Elster,  1999 ). Undoubtedly, if politicians or CEOs justifi ed decisions by referring 
to “how it feels,” they would be perceived as spooky at best, if not downright 
irresponsible. This reputation of feelings as irrational is noteworthy because indi-
viduals frequently rely on fl uency experiences in judgment (see Greifeneder, 
Bless, & Pham,  2011 , for a recent review of empirical evidence). Would such 
frequent reliance have evolved, if reliance on fl uency was generally misleading? 
Contrary to such a pessimistic perspective, we argue that fl uency experiences may 
promote valid judgments. For this argument, we presuppose that fl uency is gener-
ally an ecologically valid source of information (see also Herzog & Hertwig, 
Chapter 12, this volume). Going beyond such  source validity , we adopt a process 
perspective and examine to what extent two of the critical process steps in fl uency-
based judgments—attribution and interpretation (see Unkelbach & Greifeneder, 
Chapter 2, this volume)—may promote or hamper  judgment validity. We suggest 
that these two process steps operate on swift defaults which are, however, backed-
up with sophisticated safety nets. We believe that a more refi ned understanding of 
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judgment validity is critical given that individuals rely on fl uency when forming 
important judgments and decisions, such as whether to display trust or cooperative 
behavior (Greifeneder, Müller, Stahlberg, Van den Bos, & Bless, 2011a, 2011b; 
Müller, Greifeneder, Stahlberg, Van den Bos, & Bless,  2010 ). 
 The present chapter is organized as follows. First, we refl ect on why feelings 
are often perceived as misleading, despite good reasons to assume that fl uency 
has source validity. In a second and third step, we then examine the potential 
effects that two critical process steps may have on judgment validity, namely 
attribution—which links fl uency to a source—and interpretation—which assigns 
meaning with respect to a criterion. 1 
 Why feelings are perceived as misleading 
 Without doubt, feelings in general, and fl uency experiences in particular, 
may lead astray—just as conscious rational thought, or content-based heuristic 
 thinking may be misleading (Tversky & Kahneman,  1974 ). For feelings, many of 
these misleading instances are particularly salient, because they are often 
characterized by strong intensity—consider the folk wisdom that “hatred or love 
are blind.” Such instances stand out, such as black sheep in a large herd of white 
ones. This standing out, however, is not informative about how often such 
instances occur, so that we may fall prey to a sampling error when judging 
feelings as misleading based on salient instances. 
 Curiously, the perception of feelings as troublemakers is fostered by those who 
investigate the impact of feelings, because these researchers often report on 
seemingly misleading infl uences of feelings in judgment. Consider what we will 
refer to as Tversky and Kahneman’s ( 1973 , Experiment 3)  letter experiment . 
Participants were asked, for instance, whether there are more English words that 
begin with the letter “r” than words with the letter “r” in the third position. The 
researchers found that words beginning with “r” were judged to be more numer-
ous, even though the opposite is true in the English language. This systematic 
error was explained by reliance on fl uency experiences in judgment. Participants 
presumably formed frequency judgments based on the experience of ease or 
diffi culty associated with the recall of content from memory—after all, if it feels 
easy to retrieve words that start with the consonant “r,” there are probably many. 
However, because recall fl uency is not necessarily indicative of category 
frequency, the letter experiment exemplifi es a situation in which fl uency consti-
tutes a misleading source of information. 
 Similarly, in what we will refer to as the  fame experiment , participants were 
asked to read aloud a list of non-famous names such as “Sebastian Weisdorf” 
(Jacoby, Kelley, Brown, & Jasechko,  1989 ). One day later, participants formed 
fame judgments about previously presented (and therefore old) non-famous 
names and new non-famous names. The old names were rated as more famous 
than the new names, seemingly because the old names (including Sebastian 
Weisdorf) felt more familiar than the new ones. Again, feelings of familiarity 
(fl uency) seem to have produced erroneous judgments. 
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 At face value, such scientifi c evidence suggests that feelings are troublemak-
ers. It should be kept in mind, however, that experiments of this kind are inten-
tionally constructed so that reliance on fl uency experiences will lead astray. This 
is because, from a scientifi c perspective, seemingly wrong judgments are often 
particularly diagnostic (see Greifeneder,  2007 ). Researchers therefore take great 
effort in designing experiments in which the use of fl uency is unjustifi ed, because 
this is one way to show that feelings were relied upon in the fi rst place (for a 
similar argument in other domains, e.g., Gilovich, Griffi n, & Kahneman,  2002 ; 
Kahneman & Tversky,  1996 ; Kruglanski & Ajzen,  1983 ). This, however, does 
not render such illogical uses  representative for the totality of instances in which 
feelings are used in judgment, and hence not diagnostic about judgment validity 
(Greifeneder et al.,  2011 ). 
 Together, the tendency of erroneous feeling-based judgments to stand out and 
researchers’ preference for investigating seemingly illogical uses of feelings 
in judgment may have contributed to the dodgy light that feelings are often 
perceived in. The following is to argue that such a perspective does not do justice 
to the validity of feelings in judgment. In what follows, we will focus on fl uency 
experiences specifi cally. The majority of our conjectures, however, will likely 
hold for a broader class of feelings, too. 
 Our discussion centers around two critical process components in fl uency-
based judgments—attribution and interpretation (see Unkelbach & Greifeneder, 
Chapter 2, this volume)—and their effects on judgment validity. A precondition 
for this argument is that fl uency allows—at least theoretically—for valid 
judgments when used appropriately. This precondition of source validity is 
shortly discussed next. 
 Source validity 
 We start our argument by assuming that there is reason to have faith in the 
ecological validity of fl uency as an information cue. In addition to the empirical 
evidence reviewed by Herzog and Hertwig (Chapter 12, this volume), several 
conceptual arguments may be advanced in support of this argument. 
 First, fl uency has been suggested to be a result of constant monitoring of 
cognitive activity and to continuously code the “how” of our cognition 
(Whittlesea & Williams,  2000 ). This coding not only encompasses that some-
thing was processed, but also the architectural properties of the underlying asso-
ciative network. For instance, the strength and closeness of associations likely 
infl uence the ease or diffi culty with which some piece of information can be 
recalled from memory. By being dependent on this learnt network structure, 
fl uency experiences do not refl ect single events in a vacuum, but single events 
against the background of a larger whole, the individual’s learning history. 
This larger whole renders fl uency experiences particularly valuable information 
carriers. 
 Second, because we are usually not aware of the architectural properties of our 
associative network system, fl uency experiences may tell us more than we can 
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consciously know. This is not only true for architectural properties, but also for 
content that remains below the threshold of consciousness. Consider, for instance, 
tip-of-the-tongue states, in which participants feel that they know a certain piece 
of information, yet are currently unable to access it (Schwartz,  2002 ; see also 
feeling of knowing, Koriat,  1993 ; Nelson, Gerler, & Narens,  1984 ). Similarly, 
with feelings of familiarity, individuals feel to have encountered an object or a 
person before (i.e., are familiar with it), but are not able to specify this encounter 
(e.g., Whittlesea,  1993 ). Fluency experiences may thus refl ect information that is 
not consciously accessible. 
 To the extent that integrating a lot of information that is accessible both 
consciously and subconsciously promotes reliability, fl uency experiences should 
allow for relatively accurate judgments. This statistical argument is refl ected in 
the characterization of fl uency experiences as “meta-summaries” (Koriat & 
Levy-Sadot,  1999 ), which holds that fl uency experiences integrate multiple 
pieces of information into a single whole. Compared to single pieces of accessi-
ble content information, fl uency experiences are therefore relatively effi cient 
information carriers (see also Greifeneder & Bless,  2007 ). That such 
meta-summaries may be quite accurate predictors has been shown, for instance, 
in the realm of feelings of knowing. Hart ( 1965 ) asked participants to answer 
general knowledge questions such as “How many sides are there in a hexagon?” 
For non-recalled answers, participants made feeling of knowing predictions, 
which were then compared to recognition performance. As expected, feelings of 
knowing predicted recognition reliably above chance, thus attesting to the idea 
that fl uency experiences may allow for valid judgments. 
 In sum, fl uency experiences may be expected to be a reasonably valid 
source of information because they code current events against the background 
of a large information basis and because they code multiple pieces of information 
into a single whole. Arguably, these considerations may increase faith in 
the source validity of fl uency experiences, but do not allow to qualify how 
valid judgments based on fl uency experiences are. To answer this question 
about  judgment validity , it is important to focus on the judgmental processes 
that underlie the  use of (ecologically valid) fl uency experiences in 
judgment. What follows is to address this question, separately for attribution and 
interpretation. 
 Attribution: what causes fluency? 
 For a feeling to infl uence judgment, it needs to be attributed. In the course of the 
attribution process, it is determined what presumably caused fl uency, and what 
fl uency may therefore be informative about (see Unkelbach & Greifeneder, 
Chapter 2, this volume). In what follows, we fi rst describe general aspects of this 
attribution process, which we label as “swift defaults,” because they operate on 
effi cient but fallible rules. In a second step, we focus on more specifi c aspects of 
the attribution process, which we label as “sophisticated safety nets,” because 
they likely ensure that attribution is not a constant source of error. 
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 Swift defaults 
 Whittlesea, Jacoby, and Girard ( 1990 ) conceptualized the attribution process as 
automatic. The attribution process is further said to be controlled by whatever is 
salient and applicable at the time of attribution, that is, what happens in temporal 
contiguity to the experienced feeling. This tendency has been referred to as 
immediacy principle (Clore et al.,  2001 ) or aboutness principle (Higgins,  1996 ). 
As a result, fl uency experiences are generally perceived as immediate reactions 
to whatever is currently in the focus of attention—“Why else would I be experi-
encing fl uency just now?” 
 While ascribing causality by contiguity allows for swift and effortless attribu-
tion, it widely opens the door for biases. Tversky and Kahneman ( 1973 ), for 
example, took advantage of the attribution inference based on temporal contigu-
ity. In their letter experiment, participants presumably judged the frequency of 
words with the letter “r” in the fi rst compared to the third position based on the 
fl uency with which instances of the respective category come to mind. This likely 
occurred because participants did not attribute experienced fl uency to its true 
cause—that memory cues words by their fi rst and not by their third letter—but 
spontaneously misattributed experienced recall fl uency to an apparent cause—
that some word categories are more frequent than others. Participants seem to 
haven fallen prey to temporal contiguity, which supposedly suggested that 
perceived recall fl uency is telling about ecological frequency, because it was 
experienced  when frequency was judged. 
 Similarly, in the fame experiment, Jacoby, Kelley, Brown and Jasechko, ( 1989 ) 
exploited the attribution by contiguity mechanism. The fi nding that participants 
judged old non-famous names (e.g., Sebastian Weisdorf) as more famous than new 
non-famous names likely occurred because perceived fl uency associated with old 
non-famous names was not attributed to its true cause—recall fl uency caused by 
prior exposure—but misattributed to an apparent cause—recall fl uency caused by 
fame—simply because the fl uency experience and the fame assessment coincided. 
Both of these examples illustrate that the attribution inference is parsimonious but 
fallible. 
 Unfortunately, misattributions based on contiguity are not confi ned to the 
laboratory. Consider the case of unintentional plagiarism, which has been linked 
to misattributed fl uency experiences (Jacoby, Kelley, & Dywan,  1989 ). Plagiarism 
may occur unintentionally presumably because the previous exposure to a 
sentence infl uences the fl uency with which the sentence presents itself later, thus 
rendering the sentence compelling when authors put their “own” thoughts into 
words. In this case, fl uency from prior exposure is not attributed to its true 
cause—prior exposure—, but misattributed to an apparent cause—compellingness—
simply because fl uency is felt when compellingness is considered. As another 
non-laboratory example consider that individuals have been shown to overesti-
mate the prevalence of extreme causes of death, such as fl ood, homicide, or 
tornado (Lichtenstein, Slovic, Fischhoff, Layman, & Combs,  1978 ). This overes-
timation presumably occurs due to biased media-coverage, which heightens the 
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accessibility of certain lethal events and thereby distorts accessibility-based 
judgments of actual frequency (Combs & Slovic,  1979 ). 
 Such fi ndings illustrate that attribution based on contiguity may lead astray 
when joint occurrence is not indicative of causality. This may have far-reaching 
consequences. For instance, in the realm of education, it has been shown that 
essays are evaluated more positively when written in legible compared to less 
legible handwriting (Greifeneder, Zelt, Seele, Bottenberg, & Alt, 2012; James, 
 1929 ). Presumably, this legibility bias occurred because fl uency is not attributed 
to its true source—differences in legibility—, but misattributed to an apparent 
cause—the work’s quality (Greifeneder et al.,  2010 ). Again, this misattribution 
likely arises because fl uency is experienced  when the work’s quality is assessed 
(temporal contiguity), and does not refl ect a causal relationship between 
handwriting legibility and work quality. 
 Sophisticated safety nets 
 Naïve theories of causation. Since attribution depends largely on temporal conti-
guity, it has been referred to as fl uency’s Achilles’ heel (Greifeneder et al.,  2010 ). 
Fortunately, however, contiguity is not the sole criterion for attribution, which is 
probably more accurately assessed when appropriate naïve theories about 
causation are available. For instance, when individuals are explicitly told that 
handwriting legibility causes differences in perceived fl uency, handwriting 
legibility is no longer used to evaluate the work’s quality (Greifeneder et al., 
 2010 ). Apparently perceived fl uency is then correctly attributed to differences in 
legibility, and no longer misattributed to the work’s quality. This suggests that 
once individuals know about fl uency’s true source, temporal contiguity is less 
powerful. More generally, naïve theories of causation seem to qualify contiguity. 
 As a second example consider fi ndings by Jacoby and Whitehouse ( 1989 ). The 
authors observed that processing fl uency may be enhanced when a test word is 
preceded by a masked prime. When this priming occurred unobtrusively, partici-
pants experienced an illusion of familiarity presumably because they did not 
correctly attribute fl uency to priming. However, when the primes were presented 
for longer durations, participants were less likely to display an illusion of famili-
arity, seemingly because they correctly attributed fl uency to the priming proce-
dure. Note that this example is different from the handwriting example in that 
participants were not told about fl uency’s true source, but identifi ed the true 
source themselves. 
 As a third example consider an experiment in which participants also spontane-
ously identifi ed the true source of fl uency. Oppenheimer (2004) reported that 
retrieval fl uency is generally a good proxy for judging the frequency of names in 
a population, because familiar names are generally more prevalent. However, 
when evaluating celebrity names such as “Bush,” for which fl uency is less or not 
indicative of prevalence, participants’ frequency judgments were not infl uenced 
by retrieval fl uency. Presumably this is because participants were aware of the 
fact that intensive media coverage is the reason for why celebrity names felt so 
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fl uent, and therefore ceased to use recall fl uency as an indicator of name 
frequency. This example illustrates that appropriate naïve theories of causation 
may be available to individuals as part of their “world knowledge” and need not 
necessarily be provided as part of experimental procedures. 
 Together these fi ndings suggest that although the contiguity principle renders 
the attribution mechanism fallible, it is not the sole criterion determining attribu-
tion. All things considered, however, incorrect attribution may still be the largest 
source of error when it comes to the validity of fl uency in judgment. This is 
because the automaticity and speed that the contiguity-based immediacy (or 
aboutness) principle grants comes with a price: whenever contiguity is not 
indicative of causality, the contiguity rule likely points to an incorrect source of 
fl uency. Nevertheless, misattribution in the “wild” may be less likely than one 
would expect based on evidence accrued in the laboratory. This is because in 
experimental settings researchers try to disentangle the cause of the feeling from 
the judgment situation, for instance by manipulating fl uency orthogonally to the 
judgment task (e.g., Reber & Schwarz,  1999 ). In contrast, in natural settings, 
dissociations between cause of feeling and judgment situation may be less likely 
(see Bless, Keller, & Igou,  2009 ). 
 Correlations between causes. In addition to naïve theories of causation there is 
a second safety net, which is statistical in nature. Specifi cally, fl uency may 
promote valid judgments even if it is attributed to a wrong cause because true and 
wrong causes often covary. Consider again the letter experiment conducted by 
Tversky and Kahneman ( 1973 ), in which participants incorrectly attributed 
fl uency resulting from architectural properties of memory to word category 
frequency. For the consonants chosen by Tversky and Kahneman ( 1973 )—for 
instance, the letter “r”—there are more words in the English language where this 
letter occurs in the third compared to the fi rst position. For these letters, fl uency 
resulting from architectural properties of memory organization is negatively 
correlated to word frequency. Critically, however, there are only eight consonants 
in the English language for which this is true, whereas for 14 consonants there 
are more words that have the respective consonant in the fi rst compared to third 
position (as spelt out in the original contribution, Tversky & Kahneman,  1973 ). 
For this majority of cases, fl uency resulting from architectural properties of 
memory organization is positively correlated to frequency. Hence, in this major-
ity of cases, relying on fl uency when judging frequency will result in valid judg-
ments even though fl uency was misattributed. More generally, when wrong and 
correct attribution targets covary, misattribution may result in valid judgments. 
 Interpretation: What does fluency mean? 
 Once fl uency is attributed, individuals need to draw inferences from fl uency with 
respect to a criterion. Should we infer from fl uent recall that something is 
frequent or infrequent, true or wrong, good or bad? This step is generally referred 
to as interpretation (see Unkelbach & Greifeneder, Chapter 2, this volume). 
Again, we differentiate “swift defaults” and “sophisticated safety nets.” 
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 Swift defaults 
 Context dependency. In the fame experiment, participants inferred fame from 
fl uency (Jacoby, Kelley, Brown et al.,  1989 ). But how come that these individuals 
interpreted fl uency as fame, and not as frequency, like participants in the letter 
experiment did (Tversky & Kahneman,  1973 )? Again, contiguity seems to be an 
important player, in that fl uency gains meaning within the (temporal) context it is 
experienced. Consider a set-up of Schwarz and Schuman ( 1997 ), who created 
conditions of recall diffi culty by asking US participants if they remembered 
anything special their representative had done for the district. Subsequently, 
participants were asked to evaluate either their representative’s effort to keep them 
informed (public relations), or how closely they themselves followed politics 
(political interest). Now think of yourself: when asked about the representative’s 
public relations behavior, the recall disfl uency previously experienced in relation 
to the representative’s voting behavior likely suggests that  public relations are 
bad—after all, when you experience diffi culties in recalling the representative’s 
voting behavior, her/his public relations would seem ineffective. But when asked 
about your own interest in politics, the experienced disfl uency likely signals  disin-
terest —after all, when you have diffi culties recalling such voting behavior, are 
you really serious about politics? This example illustrates that what we infer from 
fl uency is often dependent on the context in which fl uency is experienced. 
 Naïve theories of meaning. The context seems to trigger the judgmental 
domain that fl uency is informative about (e.g., frequency, truth, valence, etc.), but 
is likely silent in which direction on each judgmental continuum fl uency points. 
How do we know whether fl uency signals, for instance, that a name is famous or 
insignifi cant? Schwarz ( 2004a ) proposed that individuals hold naïve theories 
about what fl uency means in a specifi c context. These naïve theories of meaning 
are supposed to link fl uency experiences and judgmental inferences. Presumably 
it is such a naïve theory of meaning that let participants in the fame experiment 
know that fl uency means fame and not insignifi cance. 
 Often, naïve theories of meaning refl ect learned contingencies in the environ-
ment (for the critical role of learning, see Unkelbach,  2006 ,  2007 ). For instance, 
individuals may have observed that when they are interested in something (such 
as in politics, see above example, Schwarz & Schuman,  1997 ), it is easy to recall 
details about this topic. Likewise, when they are not interested, individuals may 
have experienced that recall of pertaining information is diffi cult. In both cases, 
a certain level of interest is associated with certain recall experiences. Now 
suppose that you have problems recalling a specifi c piece of information (e.g., 
your representative’s voting behavior). If you want to draw conclusions about 
your interest in the associated larger topic (e.g., politics), one possibility is to 
reverse the interest-fl uency logic into a fl uency-to-interest inference. For instance, 
you may infer from recall diffi culty (e.g., “I can’t think of anything the repre-
sentative did”) that you are not interested in politics (e.g., “I never really cared”). 
 The politics example illustrates that meaning may result from basic psycho-
logical inference principles. These inferences principles are relatively swift but 
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rough and may therefore pose several threats to judgment validity. First, a high 
level of contextual dependency opens the door for unsystematic infl uences of 
many kinds. Second, the described inference process reverses the logical order of 
antecedent and consequent, in that something about the antecedent (e.g., political 
interest) is inferred from the consequent (e.g., recall fl uency). This inference is 
only correct when the contingency is biunique—that is, true in both directions 
(see Bless & Schwarz,  1999 , for an extended discussion). If the relationship is not 
bi-unique, inferring the antecedent from the consequent may result in error. 
Third, when cause and consequence covary sequentially over extended periods of 
time, individuals may not be able to observe contingencies and therefore may 
hold wrong naïve theories. One such example has been reported by Benjamin, 
Bjork, and Schwartz ( 1998 , Experiment 1). Participants were asked to answer 
general knowledge questions and to estimate the likelihood of being able to 
retrieve the respective answers in a later free recall test. Results show that partic-
ipants were more likely to retrieve answers the longer they had initially taken to 
answer the general knowledge questions. Future recall performance was thus 
positively correlated with initial recall latencies, presumably because initial 
elaboration increases the likelihood of later recall (e.g., Craik & Lockhart,  1972 ). 
Participants’ initial estimations, however, were different. Specifi cally, 
participants judged future retrieval to be  less likely the longer initial retrieval 
latencies were, thus committing a prediction error with potentially serious conse-
quences for the allocation of learning times. It would seem that this prediction 
error occurred because participants held a wrong naïve theory of meaning about 
what fl uency in recall means. The existence of such a wrong naïve theory may be 
due to a dearth of clearly observable contingencies in the environment (for related 
evidence, see Nelson & Leonesio,  1988 ). 
 Sophisticated safety nets 
 That interpretation operates on swift defaults may result in erroneous judgments. 
Which safety nets are in place? First, there is reason to assume that associatively 
represented contingencies may not be correlational but more akin to partial 
regression coeffi cients, as has been argued for in the realm of associatively repre-
sented heuristics (Smith & DeCoster,  2000 ; Uleman,  1999 ). One may therefore 
speculate that individuals rely on reversed inferences particularly when these 
have proven reliable in the past. 
 Second, because the meaning of fl uency is often derived from learned contin-
gencies, it refl ects what individuals have learned about themselves and their ecol-
ogy over long periods of time. To the extent that many observations allow for 
more reliable inference rules, relatively accurate interpretations may be expected. 
In this respect, it is noteworthy that naïve theories of meaning are not highly 
subjective and idiosyncratic, but socially shared. This is because the variation in 
the environment is similar across individuals so that inferred theories of meaning 
are similar, too. In line with this reasoning, Schwarz ( 2004b ) observed a remarka-
bly high consensus in participants’ agreement on naïve theories. Interestingly, this 
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also suggests that naïve theories of meaning are generally stable within 
individuals. 
 In sum, interpretation is infl uenced by contextual variables and naïve theories 
of meaning. Both carry some threat to validity, as the underlying rules are often 
effi cient but not perfectly accurate. Specifying this threat in absolute terms is 
diffi cult; however, a relative comparison to conscious integration of accessible 
content information is plausible. This argument is based on the notion that judg-
ments formed on the basis of declarative knowledge are also inferential, and 
depend on acquired naïve theories of meaning. For instance, an alternative expla-
nation to Tversky and Kahneman’s ( 1973 ) letter experiment is that participants 
actually recalled more words having the letter “r” in the fi rst compared to third 
position. When forming a frequency judgment based on this recalled content, 
participants may have come to the conclusion that words with the letter “r” in the 
fi rst position are more numerous, because “when I can recall many words, the 
category is probably numerous.” Such a naïve theory of meaning may be correct, 
but may also be wrong—as in the letter experiment, where the recall of more 
words with the letter “r” in the fi rst position is not indicative of true category 
frequency in the environment. As this example illustrates, judgments based on 
content information may also require naïve theories of meaning that have been 
learned throughout ontogenesis. To the extent that naïve theories used for 
drawing inferences based on content information versus fl uency experiences are 
similarly valid, one would expect that content-based versus fl uency-based 
judgments should result in judgments of similar validity. 
 The role of expertise 
 The present chapter’s main focus is on the impact that attribution and interpreta-
tion may have on the validity of fl uency-based judgments. We have suggested 
that the validity of reliance on fl uency experiences in judgment depends in many 
respects on learned contingencies that are refl ected in naïve theories of causa-
tion—which qualify the contiguity principle in attribution—and naïve theories of 
meaning—which guide interpretation. Because both often depend on prior learn-
ing, one may argue that fl uency will be a more accurate indicator in judgment the 
more learning has occurred, that is, the more refi ned the associative network 
structure is. Fluency experiences should therefore allow for more valid judgments 
the more expertise a person has acquired in a specifi c domain. And in their 
domain of expertise, experts compared to novices may be expected to draw more 
accurate conclusions from fl uency. To our knowledge, no evidence directly 
addressing this conclusion is available, despite interesting implications. 
 Note that the validity with which experts compared to novices form judgments 
based on fl uency needs to be treated separately from the frequency with which they 
do so. With respect to frequency, prior research has shown that experts compared 
to novices rely less (and not more) on fl uency (e.g., Janssen, Müller, & Greifeneder, 
2011; Ofi r, 2000; Tybout, Sternthal, Malaviya, Bakamitsos, & Park,  2005 ). 
Perhaps this is (a) because experts have not only more refi ned fl uency experiences, 
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but also more refi ned factual knowledge, and (b) because experts perceive their 
factual knowledge as relatively more telling based on the societal norm that sound 
judgments should refl ect conscious rational thought. The specifi c reasons for this 
difference are, however, not yet fully understood and further research is needed to 
more closely understand the role expertise is playing in the validity of, and reliance 
on, fl uency in judgment. Until then, it is interesting to note the apparent discrep-
ancy between more accurate fl uency-based judgments for experts compared to 
novices, but less frequent reliance on fl uency as information. Perhaps what is 
needed is that experts (are allowed to) have more faith in their fl uency experiences. 
 Conclusion 
 In this chapter, we have discussed several threats to the validity of fl uency-based 
judgments, which result from underlying mechanisms that are speedy 
and  effi cient, but rough and sometimes fallible. However, in most cases, the 
 weaknesses of these mechanisms seem to be at least partially counteracted by 
other mechanisms, such as when the fallibility of the contiguity principle in attri-
bution is qualifi ed by naïve theories of causation. By and large, fl uency may 
therefore allow for reasonably valid judgments. This should be seen in light of 
the fact that the validity of alternative judgment pathways, such as conscious 
integration of accessible content information, may be lowered by factors that 
usually not affect fl uency-based judgments. For instance, it has been suggested 
that the integration and weighing of single pieces of content information is error-
prone (e.g., Wänke,  1996 ). Moreover, content-based judgment formation has 
been argued to be seriously constrained by limitations of consciousness (e.g., 
Dijksterhuis & Nordgren,  2006 ; Miller,  1956 ). Both of these aspects do not apply 
to fl uency-based judgments. Consequently, one may venture the speculative 
conclusion that all things considered, fl uency-based judgments are not less valid 
than content-based judgments, but perhaps even more. This conclusion is in line 
with the claim that fl uency-based and content-based judgments are generally 
aligned, as illustrated in the letter experiment (Tversky & Kahneman,  1973 ). We 
therefore suggest that it is time to have more faith in fl uency-experiences, and to 
embrace the enrichment a “feeling” perspective can bring to models of human 
functioning, both within and beyond the realm of psychology. 
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 Note 
 1 Note that attribution and interpretation often work in tandem and may be “amalgamated” 
within one step (for a discussion see Unkelbach & Greifeneder, Chapter 2, this volume). 
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While it is conceptually important to separate the two process steps, many examples 
in the literature are ambiguous with respect to whether a specifi c pattern of results is 
due to differences in attribution (“caused by”) or interpretation (“indicative of”). We 
have approached this ambiguity by selecting examples according to whether the 
attribution or interpretation process was likely dominant. We acknowledge, however, 
that some of the cited evidence could also be categorized differently. To resolve this 
ambiguity in future research, it will be important to conceptualize whether fl uency 
can be attributed to specifi c causes (e.g., prior exposure)—which strongly constrain 
interpretation and thus result in an amalgamation of attribution and interpretation—
or only to more general causes (e.g., recall)—which open the door for a larger set of 
possible inferences. 
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